Introduction
"The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox a large indigenous population 5 or imported slaves (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001) .
And the absence of central government left settlers to fend for themselves, experimenting with new and more egalitarian forms of administration such as the township, the Cossack Krug, or local assembly (Tocqueville 1835) .
Perhaps one of the best known arguments that the settlement process led to a unique set of social and political institutions is the 'frontier thesis' of American historian Frederick Jackson Turner, expressed in his 1893 essay, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History' (Turner 1920) . Though focusing primarily on the United States, Turner had argued that it was the existence of a western expanse which could explain America's culture of individualism and egalitarianism, arguing that 'what the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities', 'the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States' (Turner 1920: 20) . Turner maintained that the frontier could explain not only American social norms, but also the consolidation of democracy, going so far as to argue that the defining struggle of the US, the abolition of slavery, was not a victory of the North over the South, but rather of the frontier over the last vestige of feudal hierarchy in the east; Lincoln himself being the 'embodiment of the pioneer period' and the 'embodiment of democracy in the west' (Turner 1920: 142-3) 6 .
Such arguments are also familiar from the works of French nobleman Alexis de
Tocqueville. In Democracy in America Tocqueville had similarly noted the 'democratic character' of the settlers, characterised by individualism, lank of hierarchy, and voluntarism; and, like Turner, saw it rooted in the relatively widespread ownership of land and consequent absence of a feudal aristocracy. In America, he argued, men are 'seen on a greater equality in point of fortune and intellect', on account of the relatively equal ownership of land, which ensured that there were no 'great landed estates' and that 'the aristocratic principle' remained weak. Notably, for Tocqueville, it was not the actual equality of wealth at any given 5 Even in Russian Siberia, there is evidence of difficulty in maintaining a servile peasantry, as Siberian peasants 'enjoyed freedom from exploitation by pomeshchiki' (feudal landlords) and as a result 'attained a standard of living which was beyond the dreams of peasants in the central provinces of European Russia' (Forsyth 1992: 115) . 6 On this point, Turner is unambiguous, arguing that: 'The free pioneer democracy struck down the slave-holding aristocracy on its march to the West' (Turner 1920: 143) .
point which mattered -indeed, he noted that there is no 'deficiency of wealthy individuals in the United States', and 'no country, indeed, where the love of money has taken stronger hold on the affections of men, and where the profounder contempt is expressed for the theory of the permanent equality of property' -yet because 'wealth circulates with inconceivable rapidity,' 'it is rare to find two succeeding generations in the full enjoyment of it'. Thus the absence of any settled hierarchy of rank and status, or the leisure to develop such systems of societal distinction; 'most of the rich men were formerly poor; most of those who now enjoy leisure were absorbed in business during their youth' (Tocqueville 1835) .
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the frontier effect observed by Turner and Tocqueville reflects a more general consequence of frontier settlement, and not simply a particularity of the United States. In section II, we extend our discussion of the theoretical background. Section III defines our understanding of the frontier, and delimits a series of cases for the study. Section IV provides a more definitive charting at the subregional level. In section V, we examine the history of frontier zones,
showing how in each country case the conditions of frontier settlement differed, yet provided an underlying uniformity to the cases. Section VI then examines empirical data to show how frontier areas differ from non-frontier areas in their social institutions.
II. Theoretical Background
Why, according to Turner and Tocqueville, did the process of frontier settlement lead to egalitarian social and political institutions? At root, both writers saw the unique condition of the frontier being its unusual combination of factor endowments. 'The most significant thing about the American frontier,' Turner had maintained, was 'that it lies at the hither edge of free land' (Turner 1920: 4) . This, in turn patterned the economic nature of frontier life, each farmer the sovereign owner of his own house on the prairie. This made it a 'democratic self-sufficing, primitive agricultural society, in which individualism was more pronounced than the community life of the lowlands,'
and the 'indented servant and the slave were not a normal part of its labor system'.
Whereas the coastal regions were specialised in the labour intensive and land constrained process of 'producing staples,' the frontier lands were 'engaged in grain and cattle raising', as well as gathering and trapping, 'supplying its scarcity of specie by the peltries which it shipped to the coast' (Turner 1921: 59) .
This economic structure, Turner had argued, had two important consequences. The first was political, with an important link from agrarian freeholding to democratic consolidation, because 'economic power secures political power' (Turner 1921: 17) .
The United States, Turner rightly noted, was not born as a consolidated democracy; its early history was characterised by numerous struggles over the extension of the franchise, the defence of liberties, and of course, the abolition of slavery. On each area, Turner notes, the frontier states added their weight to the democratic shift. Even within the Eastern states, Turner notes, it was their western 'frontier' region which had demanded and ensured a universal male vote 7 . Contemporary political scientists will recognise that similar arguments have been made about the link from agrarian, freeholding societies to premodern democracy in Switzerland or the United States (e.g. Boix, 2003) .
The second important consequence of egalitarianism in land was egalitarianism in social relations. For Turner, the 'the frontier is productive of individualism' because the settlers themselves were autonomous units, not dependent on government or upon feudal elites for their defense or their support; the frontier 'produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control' (Turner 1920: 16) . Moreover, the opportunity cost of subjugation was free land, and 'men would not accept inferior wages and a permanent position of social subordination when this promised land of freedom and equality was theirs for the taking' (Turner 1920: 145) . The frontier was a site of individualism, therefore, and also a certain equality; not an equality of income, necessarily, but an equality of status, with little in the way of aristocratic airs and graces 8 .
7 Pace Turner: 'It was western New York that forced an extension of suffrage in the constitutional convention of that State in 1821; and it was western Virginia that compelled the tide-water region to put a more liberal suffrage provision in the constitution framed in 1830, and to give to the frontier region a more nearly proportionate representation with the tide-water aristocracy' (Turner 1921: 17) . 8 This could mean 'levelling down' as well as 'levelling up'; Turner noting that not only the 'humor, bravery, and rude strength' of the frontiersman, but also 'the vices of the frontier in its worst aspect, have left traces on American character, language, and literature, not soon to be effaced' (Turner 1920, 24 If the availability of land and lack of aristocracy had led to the birth of the democratic ethos on American coastline, the accentuation of these features in the American interior saw these attributes taken there to their logical limit.
Yet because both Turner and Tocqueville wrote about the American frontier, the question this paper confronts is whether their observations are valid for frontier areas in general, or must be considered only a particularity of the American historical experience. For if the settlement of the western US was a natural experiment in history, then it is an experiment which has been repeated many times and in many different contexts, from the Brazilian jungle, to the Australian outback, to the Siberian taiga. And while the independent variables vary greatly in all these cases, with different settler peoples, colonial powers, and historical eras, if the root hypothesis is true that differential factor endowments of land and labour pattern the evolution of social and political institutions, then some trace of its effects should be found in all such cases, and not simply one.
Most studies of the effects of colonial settlement have tended to focus on explaining differences between settler societies, rather than between settler and non-settler polities. As explanations for the tendency of one region to be more prosperous, democratic, or socially cohesive, scholars may cite the impact of the policies of the colonial powers, such as whether they imposed common or civic law, or deployed direct or indirect rule (Gerring et al. 2011) . Alternatively, the nature of the settlers themselves may be highlighted, with a distinction between 'Anglo-Saxon,' protestant migration flows and non-protestant migration (Huntington 1996) . Finally, the situation of the indigenous population may be considered relevant, including its impact on the land-labour ratio, or the maintenance of extractive practices, such as the mita or labour corvee (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001) . A study of the frontier, however, would look for a common effect in all frontier areas, where land is plentiful relative to labour, and the influence of central government relatively attenuated, vis-avis non-frontier areas, including the home countries or regions of the settler population. That is the objective of this paper.
III. Defining the Frontier
The frontier may be defined by several attributes, including administrative remoteness (distance from the central government), population sparsity, or the relatively recent arrival of its transitory population. For the purpose of this project we understand frontier zones as essentially far flung regions in which most of the population are migrants, or the children of migrants, and in which, by consequence, the institutions of public order, the police and judiciary to local government and administration, are relatively young and newly formed. It is the recency of administrative structures, we argue, which constitutes the core of the frontier, and other attributes which are contributors. Areas with low population density may or may not be frontier zones, for example, though many frontier zones have low population density by virtue of the recent origin of the inhabitants; the arrival of a populus into a formerly blank geography, in new townships, and thus new mayoralties, new electoral districts, is a typical characteristic of the frontier.
Among the potential sites of study for this project, we considered a number of frontier 'zones' within contemporary polities in the world today. These were assessed based on the extent to which they meet several of the frontier criteria, namely distance from government, recency of population flows, and population sparsity. A summary is provided in Table 3 .1. 
IV. Mapping Frontier Zones
The frontier zones identified in this project then, are illustrated below in Note that for the Yamalo-Nenetsky region of Russia, the visible area on the north coast that is in light grey, is the only Arctic province which is not included in the sample; this unfortunately is for reasons of survey classification, as this territory is considered a part of the Ural economic region, rather than either the neighbouring Arctic or Siberia, and when analysing survey data is often coded simply as Ural without more detailed information. As the region accounts for only 0.35 per cent of
Russia's population, we hope that its exclusion will not significantly alter the results of our analysis.
V. History of Frontier Regions
In this section, we provide a brief historical overview of two alternative cases of frontier settlement, Russian Siberia and the Brazilian West, in order to show that similar frontier histories to those narrated by Jackson Turner can be found in other country contexts. Largely as a result of Jackson Turner's work, the frontier history of North America is relatively well developed (Billington 1977 , Hartz 1955 , Hofstadter 1949 . In this chapter, however, we aim to show that the 'frontier phenomenon' exists beyond the North American context, by examining the colonisation and settlement of the Brazilian interior, as well as the settlement of the Northern third of Asia by the Russian Empire, and later, the Soviet Union.
Russia
Before the nineteenth century, Russia's population was almost exclusively situated in its European part, along the banks and tributaries of the Volga River. However, with the charting of Siberia in the seventeenth century, settlement of the eastern lands began in earnest. We can divide this settlement process into three distinct periods. The Censuses, 1959 Censuses, , 1970 Censuses, , 1979 , and preliminary data for 1989 published in the Report on the USSR, 1990, no. 201, pp. 15-19. A new, second phase in the settlement of Siberia began in the middle of the nineteenth century, driven by the eastward migration of runaway serfs and the increasing resettlement of followers of persecuted religious sects. The latter were often at the forefront of colonisation, and their pioneering efforts resemble the American colonists to a considerable degree. Thus from 1858 to 1896 the population of the frontier zones increased by 85 per cent, and then just in another 18 years, rose again by 68 per cent. In total, 5.5 million newcomers entered the region during this period, a migration comparable to the inflows to the United States during the same era. The fastest growth was observed in the Far East, thanks to the development of Pacific markets and sea transportation, followed by Siberia, 'Steppe Land' (the region most remote from the Trans-Siberian Railway), and Turkestan. peasant settlers, and forcibly resettled prisoners and exiles. The data does not include three categories of persons that could not be registered: illegal immigrants during the times of serfdom, townspeople, and industrial workers moving from the European part of Russian into its Asian regions. Regarding the gaps in the table and the categories of settler that were not registered and accounted, the estimated number of this omitted figure can't exceed more than 600,000 people in 19 th century and 1,100,000 for the period from 1800 to 1915 (Obolenskiy, 1928) . contribution to these population flows, it would not be wholly accurate, as sometimes portrayed, to view the region as a mere 'industrialised prison camp' (Kravchenko, 1946) , as the expansion of the civilian sector also formed an important contribution to the region's growth.
Nonetheless, during the Stalinist era in particular, forced resettlement did again become a major source of population growth in Siberia ( (Polyan, 2001 ). This population resettlement occurred almost exclusively during the Stalinist era under the aegis of the infamous Gulag system, which operated from 1930 to 1960, and a substantial portion of the increase in Siberia's population during this period can be attributed to this movement. 
VI. Social Institutions of the Frontier
One of the attributes most consistently highlighted in the classical literature on frontier society is the tendency to spontaneous social organisation. In the words of Turner, one of the things 'that impressed all early travelers in the United States was the capacity for extra-legal, voluntary association,' and the 'power of the newly arrived pioneers to join together for a common end without the intervention of governmental institutions' (Turner, 1920: 189) . A century earlier, Tocqueville had also noted the widespread flourishing of 'not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types -religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute' (Tocqueville 1835). Indeed, so impressed was Tocqueville with this aspect of American society that he considered local voluntarism a defining attribute of American democracy (Goldhammer, 2007) . Distant from central government, and beset by persistent hazards and dangers from natural disaster to conflict with indigenous peoples, frontier peoples have had to act collectively to provide public goods, disaster relief, and military defence.
However, despite the resilience of the 'frontier thesis' within sociology and political science, it has not been subject to a rigorous empirical examination. Does it constitute a valid description of the social norms and institution of the western United States?
And if so, is it a pecularity of American history -or is it one manifestation of a more general 'frontier phenomenon', found in other countries and times? In order to answer these questions, in this section we examine data on the nature of social relations in frontier zones. In particular, we examine the accuracy of the hypothesis that frontier zones are more conducive to the formation of 'social capital' in the form of relatively dense social networks characterised by a strong undergrowth of voluntary activity.
Taking a wide range of survey items and a sample of four frontier areas from the United States, Brazil, Canada and the Russian Federation, we show that higher levels of voluntary activity, social trust, tolerance of outgroups, and civic protest are distinctive features of frontier life, and not simply a feature of the American historical experience.
Approaches to Social Capital
As has been widely noted, 'social capital' is a multidimensional phenomenon (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 . According to this approach, civic associations act as 'schools of democracy' by teaching their members skills in organisation and voluntary cooperation, as well as providing the horizontal networks needed in order to mobilise in pursuit of collective goals. In response to criticisms which highlighted the possibility of 'negative' social capital in which collective action might occur to achieve 'antisocial' outcomes (Berman 1997 , Levi 1997 ) a distinction was drawn between 'bonding' and 'bridging' ties, or between those ties which reinforce within-group solidarity and those which reinforce a more general sense of social solidarity by connecting diverse social strata. Accordingly, a 'normative' approach to social capital developed over a second wave of research which laid emphasis on intergroup norms such as tolerance and general social trust (Fukuyama 1995, Knack and Keefer 1997) . Greater social trust, according to this approach, facilitates collective action, and also reduces 'transaction costs' associated with economic as well as social enterprise. Important ties were also formed in this phase between social capital researchers and institutional economics, in particular in the study of how informal norms of trust reinforce and are reinforced by formal institutions of contract security (Levi 1998 , Williamson 1996 , Greif 1994 . Finally, following from the study of how informal and formal institutions relate, a school of literature from within behavioural political science has laid emphasis on the importance of informal practices relating to protest activism, such as the willingness of citizens to demonstrate, mobilise pressure campaigns through media and petition, and join in strikes or boycotts, which at the formal level serve to make elites more accountable (Inglehart et al. 2005 , Dalton 2008 , Norris 1999 .
In this section, we examine each of these dimensions of civil society as they relate to frontier and non-frontier regions of the countries under consideration. We begin by examining descriptive statistics for each of the three aspects of social capital highlighted in the literature: voluntary association, norms of intergroup tolerance and trust, and civic activism and protest. In the second section, we conduct a series of regression models to demonstrate the existence of a general 'frontier effect' on each of these areas of social organisation.
i) Voluntary Association
The first dimension of social capital which we investigate is the extent of voluntary association. We measure voluntary association by reference to a battery of questions fielded in the World Values Surveys, in which respondents were asked to report, for a range of different types of civic association (religious, cultural, professional etc) whether they are an 'active member', an 'inactive' member, or 'not' a member at all.
We find compelling evidence that voluntary activity is more widespread in frontier areas. Figure 6 .1, for example, shows the proportion of respondents in both core and frontier zones of the US, Canada, Russia and Brazil who report being either 'active'
or 'inactive' members of arts and cultural associations. It is noteworthy that the proportion is elevated in every frontier region, relative to the country average. In a number of cases, the gap is quite large: the distance between the frontier and non-frontier regions of Canada, for example, is substantially larger than the gap between Canada as a whole and the United States. Similarly, the frontier regions of Russia are as close, on this measure, the non-frontier regions of Brazil as they are to the rest of the Federation.
Overall, then, these results are consistent with the view that life in the frontier zone are conducive to a higher level of spontaneous social organisation than life in the dense and settled 'core zones' of a state.
ii) Normative Dimensions of Civic Life

Social Trust
The second dimension of social capital upon which we report is the 'normative' aspect; whether there is a high level of tolerance and trust between members of society. Since Almond and Verba's classic (1963) study of civic culture, one of the most widely used survey indicators is a question asking respondents whether they feel that 'in general, people can be trusted' in their society, or whether 'you can't be too careful who you trust'. Displayed in Figure 6 .2 are the proportions who report a subjective sense of social trust, across the frontier and non-frontier zones of the four countries under consideration. General social trust is higher in all of the frontier zones of each country, with the exception of Brazil. This is a surprising finding, given the higher correlation between social trust and lower crime rates; and the fact that inhabitants of frontier zones are at significantly greater risk of violent crime than in non-frontier areas (explored further in the next chapter). Furthermore, for this item the within-country differences are generally smaller than the between-country differences.
Outgroup Tolerance
As well as social trust, another importance 'normative' dimension of social capital is outgroup tolerance, defined as the willingness to 'get along' with individuals of a different origin or identity. In every country the proportion of respondents in frontier areas willing to engage in protest is higher than in the non-frontier areas, with the notable and perhaps surprising exception of the United States, where the proportion is marginally lower. These results are perhaps surprisingly, given that mass demonstration is typically associated with the metropolitan centre rather than peripheral frontier zones; yet this may simply reflect a bias in news reporting due to the overweighting of correspondents in such areas. We can see for example that in Russia, inhabitants of Siberia are significantly more likely to have engaged in social protest than residents in other regions of the country.
Regression Models
It is possible that the descriptive associations illustrated above do not reflect deeper attributes of a 'frontier culture', but instead reflect contingent attributes that may result from the certain socioeconomic attributes of the frontier areas, such as that they may be disproportionately small towns, or have older and more settled residents, or perhaps have lower levels of educational attainment. In order to establish an independent association between frontier zones and higher levels of 'social capital', we report results on Table 6 .1 of a series of regressions on the country samples, Note: In the first model for voluntary association, the Russian cases are dropped due to absence of education data during the waves of the survey in which these voluntary association items were fielded in the Russia. In the second model, the education variable is dropped to bring these cases back into the sample.
The models demonstrate that certain sociodemographic attributes are strongly associated with aspects of social capital, in particular income and education; these are predictive of higher trust, tolerance of outgroups, and civic activism. The period effect, as measured by the year of the survey, suggests that social trust and voluntary association have been declining over time, while the age effect suggests older individuals have greater social trust, though a lower tolerance of outgroups and a lesser propensity to engage in civic activism.
The models also show that, other things equal, inhabitants of frontier zones are likely to have higher social trust, be more tolerant of neighbours who are migrants, or from a different ethnic group, and more likely to have engaged in some form of civic activism, such as protest or petition. The coefficients suggest that, all else equal, an estimated 5 per cent more residents of frontier zones in the regression sample say that people can 'generally be trusted', relative to non-frontier zones, against a sample mean of 32.7 per cent. Furthermore, 1 per cent more will tolerate a neighbour who is foreign or of a different race, relative to the sample mean rate of rejection of 7.6 per cent.
A Global Frontier Effect?
From de Tocqueville to Putnam, much of the literature on the frontier and its effects on civic association and the performance of local-level institutions has been based on the experience of the United States (Tocqueville 1835 , Putnam 2000 . Meanwhile, a number of scholars have questioned the extension of the frontier hypothesis, and even de Tocqueville contrasted the manners of settlement of the United States and Russia (Robinson and Jimeno-Garcia 2011) . A natural question arises therefore as to whether the coefficients observed in Table 6 .1 reflect only the influence of US observations, or whether the frontier effect can be observed independent of this sample. For that reason, Table 6 .2 shows the results of the previous set of regressions, but with the US respondents excluded, and thus only the sample of respondents from Russia, Canada and Brazil. Because of the predominance of 'Indians' in the Brazilian interior, the activities of the advancing frontiersmen were defined largely by their relationship with the indigenous population. Or, in the curt estimate of Hemming, 'the Brazilian interior had only one commodity of interest to Europeans: its native inhabitants' (Hemming 1987: 147) .
Royal edicts against the use of indigenous slaves, in 1570, 1595, 1609, 1655 and 1680, were largely disregarded by the settler population, such that 'Indian slaves acquired legally or illegally were used everywhere,' and 'could be found in the governor's household, on the plantations of the Jesuits, and on the estates of the settlers' (Schwartz 1987: 125) . A loophole in the colonial prohibition on enslavement allowed for Indians to be taken if they were indios de corda, prisoners of intertribal disputes, or members of tribes that challenged Portuguese rule. Such clauses were grossly abused, though the conditions of frontier life furnished ample opportunities for 'legal' enslavement, for indigenous uprisings against Portuguese rule occurred with increasing frequency, reaching a high point with the battle against the Manau in 1723, and the Ge uprising led by Mandu Ladino from 1712-9.
Parallel to the economic inequality between settler and native peoples, the political institutions of the frontier were similarly exclusive. The basic unit of urban governance, the senado da camera, was elected based on a complicated franchise which ensured the exclusion of those of 'ethnic impurity' (Schwartz 1987: 130) . As a consequence of the interests they represented, these local democratic councils lobbied extensively for greater leeway to enslave the Indian populus, rather than rely on more expensive imported slaves (Schwartz 1987: 130) . The high point of such lobbying efforts was their successful appeal to expulse the Jesuit orders from their territories, who had from the start mobilised against the exploitation of the Indian population. 'A campaign of vilification and complaint against them was mounted that eventually contributed to their ultimate expulsion from Brazil' (Schwartz 1987: 121) ; 'the virulence of the struggle between the colonists and the missionary orders sprang ultimately from the economy and the central role of Indian labour within it' (Schwartz 1987: 121) .
After the colonists had succeeded in removing the Jesuits, abuse of the native population increased; this culminated in a further 1755 royal edict proclaiming the manumission of those indigenous peoples held in bondage. However, even after this supposed emancipation, it is notable how economic institutions based on exploitative relations managed to persist despite a change in the formal rules. Nominally 'free' Indians were still 'forced to do very heavy labour such as making tobacco, in which they work for seven or eight months on end by day and night' (Hemming 1987: 174) .
For this they would receive payment in cloth, 'almost valueless as an item of barter' which 'could not purchase the tools or fish-hooks needed by the Indians' (Hemming 1987: 179) . Moreover, the conditions imposed on the indigenous villages remained penurious, with all Indian males aged 13-60 required to work on 'public works' and to spend half of each year working for the colonists.
Such informal norms of exploitation persisted through to the post-colonial era; during the rubber boom of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, the Amazonian for the past two years been invading Yanomami lands, extracting our gold, bringing diseases, coveting and taking our women, and pillaging our plantations' (CEDI 1985) .
Such a complaint seems entirely parallel to the complaints one reads among the reports of the Jesuit orders of the seventeenth century; at face value, there is nothing here that indicates that this statement is not from 1685, when in fact, it dates to 1985.
In the case of Brazil, a 'reverse' frontier hypothesis applies. The further one penetrated to the Brazilian frontier, the greater the availability of slave labour, and the lesser proportion of free men; thus the more pernicious the social divide and 
Conclusion
The results of the regressions in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate that the frontier effect exists at a global level, and is not simply a peculiarity of the societal trajectory of the United States. Meanwhile, the apparent Brazilian exception supports the root hypothesis that the ratio of land and labour patterns the nature of economic, and consequently political and social institutions in the frontier.
Nonetheless, an ecological paradox remains. Despite the existence of higher social capital in frontier zones in all countries, relative to non-frontier zones, as a group 'frontier countries' -i.e. those countries that have a frontier, such as Brazil, Canada, Russia and so on -do not themselves exhibit uniformly higher social trust, tolerance, or civic activism, relative to non-frontier countries. Thus while the effect of the frontier is present within all countries, this does not, by consequence, mean 'frontier'
countries have universally higher levels of social capital than those without. Indeed, the country fixed effects reported in the regression show that among these frontier cases individual country effects can large and negative, and often outweigh the effect of the frontier per se. In this respect, we can make a 'conditional' frontier hypothesis, to the effect that while many countries have a geographical frontier, only under certain very specific conditions does the frontier culture become entrenched at the national level (Robinson and Garcia-Jimeno 2011) . A perhaps obvious precondition, for example, includes the fact that the frontier itself must have been settled by a significant proportion of that country's population, and not simply left as barren terrain. This is more likely in those instances where population movement is unrestrained and land is made readily available to newcomers, as was the case for the emerging United States; but has been less true historically of Canada, Brazil, and Russia, where settlement of the frontier was a more centralised and a more controlled process. In all of these countries, until very recently the vast majority of the population has lived not along the 'frontier' but rather in the territories of the Atlantic coast, or in the case of Russia, along the European waterways, the Volga, Don and Neva. Those who made it to the frontier of Canada, or Brazil, may have lived much as their counterparts have done in the United States, autonomous and self-reliant, with relatively egalitarian and decentralised institutions, only that their numbers were remarkably fewer.
In this regard, the United States and Russia do constitute two different ends of the frontier spectrum. The United States, above all, is a country defined by its frontier; at its outset the entirety of the Americas was a frontier zone, and from an early stage in the history of the United States a large proportion of the incoming population settled out on the western expanses, in which land was made freely available to oncoming settlers. At the opposite extreme, Russia began its life as an independent nation from the principality of Muscovy, which conquered other, surrounding fiefdoms, such as Novgorod, Pskov, and the Khanates of Kazan or Astrakhan, in which institutions of serfdom and even slavery were well-entrenched. There was certainly a frontier phenomenon for Russia, and its imperial years had no shortage of gold speculators, runaways, and of course the Cossacks, with their experiments in collective selfgovernment, yet these were merely an effervescence at the edge of a polity which at its core remained rigid and autocratic. Though all of Siberia was charted by 1743, settlement of the East remained very slow, and most of the inhabitants of that region trace their descent to those who arrived only in the second half of the twentieth century. Inbetween, we can place Canada and Brazil; in Canada, migration was more restricted than in the United States, and the western provinces accounted for a relatively small proportion of the country's overall population until recent decades, when net migration to the region accelerated. Likewise, in Brazil the population of the interior remains very scattered and scarce even today. One may say therefore that the United States is a frontier nation, the country is as it is because of its frontier; whereas Russia is Russia despite of its frontier, having contained the potential for a very different path of social and political development.
